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ABSTRACT  
Thispaperexplainswhyunemployedworkersfailtoexertdownwardpressureorl   
WageS Sufficiently to eliminate unemployment．It shows that rationlng Of un－   
employmentbyseniorityeffectivelycontainsthedownwardpressure．Seniority，   
guaranteeingtocurrentjuniorworkersfutureemploymentandsofutureincome   
attheirpresentfirm，givesrisetoahighreservationwageforstartingtoworkfor   
Otherfirms．Thehighreservationwagekeepsunemployedworkersfromunderbid－   
dingwages．Theysimply stay unemployed．Bycontrast，ifrationed bylottery，   
unemploymentcreatessufficientdownwardpressureonwagestoeliminateitself   
almostentirely．  
Ⅰ．ntroduction  
Apopularexplanationofunemploymentisto attributeitto theunion’s  







allowedlegallyormorallytounderbidthewagerateoftheir ownunion．  
Evenanticipationoftheunderbiddingkeepsunionsfromsettingtheirunion  
WageSathighlevels・Thispaperaddressesthisproblemoftheunderbidding  
inunemploymenttheory．It presents a modelofthelabor market which  
takesintofullaccountthepossibilityoftheunderbiddingbyunemployed   
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workers，yetShowsthathighunionwageratescausingunemploymentare  
SuStainable．Further，the modelallowsfor fluctuation of employmentin  




becauseitisoffsetbya higherunemploymentrate（so alowerchanCeOf  
employment）resultingfromthehighwage．Thistheoryapplieswhenwages  
are setlega11y as the minimum wages，and hence the underbidding by  
unemployedworkersisprecluded．But，thispaperconsidersthecasewhere  
WageSareSetbyunions，andhencetheunderbiddingofthewagesbyunion  
OutSidersispossible．   
To be complete as an explanation ofunemployment，the union wage  








paperinstead assumes rationingby seniority asis prevalentinthe U．S．  
1abor market，and then shows that the semiority rationing effectively  
restrainsthedownwardpressureonwagesfromunemployedworkers．To  
makeclearertheimportanceofseniorityforsustainablehighunionwage  
rates and unemployment，this paper also shows that，When rationed by   
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lottery，unemploymentalmostdisappearsintheotherwisesamestructure．   
The basic reasonfor sustainablehighunion wage rates and unemploy－  
ment under the seniority rationingin this paperis the following．Junior  
WOrkerswilleventua11ybecomesenior workersby stayingwiththesame  
union．Then，theseniorityrationingguaranteesfuturejobsandso，ineffect，  
futureincome to present junior workers（uncertainty over future wage  
levelsduetoeconomicchangesapart）．Thefutureincomethusguaranteed  
under the seniority rationing at the present firm gives rise to a high 
reservationwageevenwithsmallunemploymentcompensationsandsma11  
moving cost for workers．The highreservation wage keeps unemployed  
WOrkers from underbidding wage rates of other unions and working for  
other firms．  
Grossman（1983）analyzeswageandunemploymentinaparticularunion  
inrelation to seniority，eSpeCially whether a union with a more rlgOrOuS  
Seniorityrulesetsitswageratehigherforagivendemandthanotherwise．  
He does not，however，fully consider the question of this paper，namely，  
Whetherhighunionwagerates aresustainableinfaceofthethreatofthe  
underbidding by outsiders，eSpeCia11y whether the seniority rationingis  
effectiveinsustaininghighunionwages．For，first，hedoesnottakeaccount  






indirectarbitrageistakenintoaccountonlytothelimiteddegree，andonly   
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effectoftheseniorityruleonunemployment．   
This paperis organized as follows．SectionIIpresents a modelof the  
labormarketundertheseniorityrule．SectionIIIdemonstratesandexplains   
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unemploymentinthemodel．Italsoshowsthatthelotteryrationingcannot  
sustainhighunionwagerates．AppendixprovesatheoreminSectionIII．  
I A Modelofthe LaborMarket under Seniority Rationing   
Thispapersupposesanoverlappingstructureofjobsintwofirms，firma  
andb．Jobsinfirrnaandbstartatthebeginningsofperiod2k＋1and2k＋  
2，eXtend two periods，and end at the ends of period2k＋2and2k＋3，  




themselvesforsomelengthoftime2．Employment relationshipbetweena  
firmandworkersisthenindivisibleintermsofitstimelength，andextends  
Figu「el  
thelife span of worker：S  
thelife span of workers   
born period2k   
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0VerSOmeintervaloftime．Thispaperreferstothisintervalasa50btenure．  
Job tenuresin differentfirms arenot synchronized．Inconsequence，they  
OVerlap each other．The above－mentioned structure should be the mini－  
mumtomodelextensiveandindivisiblejobtenuresandtheiroverlapplng．  
Jobsinfirma andbcontinuefortwo periodsinthe assumedstructure．  
Afterasimplechangeininterpretation，themodelofthispaperadmitsof  
jobsofoneperiodduration aswellas those oftwo periodduration．This  
Changedoesnotimplychangesinthesubstantiveconclusionofthispaper．  
Wewillcometothispointlater．   
Giventhetwoperioddurationofjobs，theusualassumptionoftwoperiod  
livingindividualsdonotsufficeforthepurposeofthepaper．Asworkers  
becomeseniorworkers onlyafter onejobtenureisfinished，theyoungest  
Seniorworkersatfirmaandbaretwoperiodold．Ifworkersliveonlytwo  
Orthreeperiods，Seniorworkerscannotworkatfirmaorbsincejobsthere  
extendtwoperiods3．Consequently，WOrkersmustbe assumedtolivefour  
periods（seeFigurel）．Aworkerwhoisjustborn，haslivedone，tWO，and  
threeperiodsisreferredtoaszero，One，tWO，andthreeyearsold．  
Junior Members  





do notjoin umion a as junior workers．Thisis becausethe one year old  
WOrkersaretoooldtobecomeseniorworkersofunionainfuture，andare  
notnecessarilyemployedinthepresentperiodbyfirmaundertheseniority   




it．Three year oldworkers arenot eligibleforjobsthatwillextendtwo  
futureperiods．Hence，1ettingPajbethenumberofjuniormembersinunion  
a，Onehas   
（1）   Paj＝N／4．  
Inthispaper，eXpOSitionsmadewithregardtoindexa（b）aresymmetri－  
callyapplicabletob（a）．Inconsequence，nOtationsandequationsarepaired・  







＝N／4．   
Behavior o†Unemployed Workers   
Atthebeginningofperiod2k＋1，thefirma’sjobtenurestarts．Firm a  
doesnotnecessarilyemployalljuniorworkersofuniona，thatis，WOrkers  




StarttOWOrkforfirmb．Theywillnotbecomejuniorworkersofunionbas   
remarkedalready．   






r）．Itfollowsthat，Choosingthefirst optionperiod2k＋2，theunemployed  
oneyearoldworkersofunionaanticipatetoreceiveW。＋（R＋R2）Wain  
thepresentvalue asofperiod2k＋2．  
Iftheychoosethesecond option，theunemployed oneyear old workers  
receivethewagerateforoutsidersatfirmb，W。b，inperiod2k＋2and2k＋  
30Ver Which a firm b’s job tenure extends．Because the wage rate for  
OutSidersis determined to equate their supplywith demand for them，  
unemployedoneyearoldworkersarecertainlyemployedandreceiveW。b  
iftheybecomeoutsiders．   
Turningtoworkforfirmbasoutsidersofuniont），unemPloyedoneyear  
Oldworkersofunionaincurnegligiblemovingcost，t．The costmaybe  
transportationcostsduetoalocationchange，OrpSyChologicalcostsdueto  
necessaryadaptationtonewenvironment．Itmustbestressedthatthecost  
is so negligible that the cost itself does not discourage any unemployed 
WOrkersfromunderbiddingthewagerateatanotherfirm，andworkingfor  
it．Theassumptionofthenegligiblemovingcostisintroducedtoensurethe  




bwhosenewjobtenurewi11continueuntilthe endofperiod3k＋5．They   
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retireandreceiveWc asunemploymentcompensations．Accordingly，the  
payofffromworkingforfirmbasoutsidersofunionbfromperiod2k＋2  
is（1＋R）W。b＋R2Wc－tinthepresentvalueasofthebeginningofperiod  
2k＋2．   
Whichoptionsunemployedoneyearoldworkers ofunionachoose at  
period2k十2dependsuponthepayoffsfromthetwooptions・WhenWc＋  
（R＋R2）Waislarger（smaller）than（1＋R）W。b＋R2Wc－t，theworkers  






Allworkers are the same，and so behave the same wayin the same   
circumstance．Then，Onehas  
N／4－Ea。ifWc＋（R＋R2）Wa＜（1十R）W。b＋R2Wc－t，  
00therwise．   
（2）Yb＝  








in SectionIII．   





Senior Members  
LetPasrepresentthenumberofseniorworkersinuniona．Seniorworkers  
Of union a at period2k＋1are a fraction of workers born two periods  
earlier，namely，period2k－1．Others，after having found themselves  
unemployed by firm a at period2k－1when they were born，Chose the  
SeCOndoptionperiod2k andstarted to workfor firmb fromthe period．  
Theywillstaywithfirmbuntilthejobtenurethereends，thatis，untilthe   
endofperiod2k＋1．Astheyare，thus，nOtinapositiontocomebacktofirm  
aatthebeginningofperiod2k＋1，theydonotbelongtounionathen．Let  
Eblbethenumberoftheseworkers．Then，Onehas，   
（3）   P8S＝N／4－Ebl．  
Bydefinition，ifPa denotesthenumber ofunionamembers，   
（4）   Pa＝P8j＋P8S  
holds．   
TheFirmb’s EmpIoymentPo］icy   
Now，COnSider firm b’s employment policy at period2k＋2under the  
Seniorityrationing．Let L（W）befirm b’s demandfor workers．L’（W）＜0．  




（andsosenior），andzeroyearold（andsojunior）membersofunionb．As   
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WaSjustintroduced above，Ebldenotes the firmb’s employment for out－   




（5）   Eb2＝EbO＝0，andEbl＝L（W。b）．  
IfWb＜W。b，firmbdoesnotdemandmoreexpensiveoutsiders．Itemploys  
L（Wb）unionb members．On account ofthe seniority rationing，the firm  
employssenior workers（two year old unionb members）first．The firm  
employsjuniorworkers（zero year old members of union b）only to the  
extentthatL（Wb）exceedsthenumberofseniorworkers．Mathematically，  
Onehas   
（6）   Eb2＝min（L（Wb），Pbs），Eb。＝L（Wb）－Eb2，andEbl＝0．   







Onehas   
（7）  Eb2＝min（L（Wb），Pbs），E。。＝CbPbj，andEbl＝C。Yb  
Wherecbisdefinedby   
（8）  cb＝（L（Wb卜Eb2）／（Yb＋Pbj）．  
The Outsider，s Market  
Demandandsupplyofoutsidersmustbalance：   
SENIORITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT  57   
（9）   Yb＝Ebl．   
Equation（9）meanSthatoutsiderscomingfromunionacompetewitheach  
Other tolower their wage，SO that alloutsiders from union a shouldbe  
employedbyfirmb．Equations（5）through（8）definefirmb，s demandfor  
junior，Seniorworkers and outsiders，giventhe union wage rate and the  
OutSider’swagerate．Equation（9）specifiesdeterminationoftheoutsider’s  
wagerateatfirmb．  
TheUnion’s Optimization Problem   
Giventhefirm’sdemandseenabove，unionbsetsitswagerateunilater－  
allyinsuchawayastomaximizethewagerevenueforitsmembers，that  




tionimplies aninefficient outcome（see Leontief（1946），Halland Lilien  
（1979），andMcDonaldandSolow（1981））．However，thesimpleassumption  









terizesthebehavior ofunionb：   
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（1O）  maxWb〈Eb。＋Eb2）subjecttoPb／2∫Eb。＋Eb2≦P。．   
The seniority rule requires that senior workers of union b should be  
employedpriortoitsjuniormembers，Whileseniorworkersofunionbare  
nomorethanhalfofunionbmembersby（1），（3），and（4）．Then，theconstraint  
Of（10）meansalltheseniorworkersarealwaysemployed；thatis，   






dingby outsiders forces unionsto settheir wages．Put another way，the  
questionisifunionsmustsettheirwageratessolowastobringoutnearly  
fullemploymentoftheirmembersinpreventingtheunderbiddingby out－  
Siders．  
Ⅱ UnemploymentinEqui［ibriumoftheUnions，Policies   
Wewi11demonstratethatwhentheseniorityrationingisinplace，eVen  
highunionwagerates arenotunderbidby outsiders，and so thatlarge  
unemploymentissustainable．  
ImakethefollowlngaSSumption：   
AssumptionlWL（W）isstrictlyconcave，andreachesitsmaximumat  
W＊  
LetL＊＝L（W＊）・ByAssumptionl，WL（W）isincreasingforW＜W＊，and   
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decreasingforW＞W＊．LetWOandWlbedefinedbyL（WO）＝N／4andL（Wl）  







s”bedefinedbyL＊（s，）＝N／4andL＊（s”）＝N／2．   
Thesecondassumptionthispaperusesis：  




work for another firmis not worthwhile，it follows from the assumption  
that demand forlabor exceeds the totallabor force．Thisisimpossible．  
Therefore，Assumption2impliesthatthewageratenetofthemovingcost  
is always positive，and that the moving costitself does not preventun－  
employedworkersfrommovingtootherfirms・   
Thispaperalsoassumes：  
Assumption3  r＝0．  
Theassumptionofthezerointerestrateisunrealistic，butitisusefulin   
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avoiding mathematicalcomplications，and high1ighting the effect of the  
seniority rationing on unemployment．Seniority rationingis based upon  
workers’appreciationofwhatisexpectedtohappeninfuture・Meaningthat  
workersvaluefutureincomeandthepresentoneequally，the assumption  
represents the extreme case of the appreciation・This assumption thus  
showsthe effect oftheseniorityrationing onunemploymentin the most   
accentuatedmanner．  
LetEifori＝a，bbethenumberofworkersemployedbyfirmi；thatis，Ei  
＝Ei。十E‖＋EJ2．Let E be E8＋Eb，namely，the totalemployment，Under  
Assumptionl，2，and3，thefollowingtheoremholds：  




E＝NandWi＝Wl（s）fors”≦s．   
Figure2depictsthetheorem．Asthestateofthefirms’productmarkets  
improves，the equilibriumlevelof employmentincreases．The theorem  
means that the seniority rationlng effectively contains the downward  
pressure on wages which would otherwise develop from frustrations of  
unemployed workers，and so that the seniority rationing createslarge  
unemploymentwhendemandforfirms’productsisnotlargeenough．   
Here，Ⅰwi11demonstratethetheoremrathercasually．（Aformalproofof  
thetheoremisdelegatedtoAppendix．）   
Thebasicreasonforsustainablehighunionwageratesinthetheoremis   
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that the seniority rationinggives rise to a high reservation wage of un－  
employedworkers．Sincepresentlyseniorworkerswillretireinthefuture，  
PreSentjunior workers are certainthat they willbe employed as senior  
WOrkersbythepresentlyassociatedfirminfutureundertheseniorityrule．  
It follows that the seniority rationing together with union democracy  






COnStitutes a high reservation wage for working elsewhere，eVenif the  
movingcostforworkersandunemploymentcompensations（orincomefrom  
Figure2  
E   




wagerates，and，inconsequence，1argeunemploymentbecomessustainable．   
Fdr a more detailed，thoughstillinformal，aCCOunt Of the theorem，  
considerthemostinterestingcaseofN／4＜L＊（s）＜N／2，namely，Wl（s）＜W＊  
（s）＜WO（s）．LetusfirstobservethatunionbdoesnotsetitswagerateWb  
aboveWa＋t／2；thatis，   
（12）  WbiWa＋t／2  
holds．   
Supposethecontrary．Then，Wb＞W。b muSthold．Otherwise，by（2），（5），  




the constraintinthe optimization problem（10）；the union wage policy of  
SettingWbaboveW。bdoesnotcreateajobforitsmembers，andcannOtbe  
ratifiedbytheunionmembers，andbeputintoeffect．Thus，a1lowableunion  
bwagepoliciesmustsatisfy（12）．   






unionbmembersisWbL（Wb）．   
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Figure 3 





WagepOlicyofunionb．   
Next considerthe case of W＊＞Wa＋t／2．Because unionb must setits  
WageratebelowWa＋t／2withthetotalwage WbL（Wb），andbecause，by  
Assumptionl，WL（W）isincreasingforW＊＞W，unionbsetsitswagerate  
atWa＋t／2．ThesegmentBIB2inFigure3depictsthiswagepolicy．   
Bythesymmetricalargument，OneCanderivetheuniona’swagepolicy   
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giventheunionb’spolicy．ThelineAIA2A3inFigure3depictsthepolicy・  
PointEinthefigurerepresentstheNashequilibrium ofuniona andb’s  
policies．Attheequilibrium，Wa＝Wb＝W＊holds・Withthesewagepolicies，  




cannot be underbid by unemployed workers to eliminate unemployment．  
Note that the negligible，but positive t assures uniqueness of the Nash  
equilibriuminFigure3．  
Lottery Rationing and Unemployment 
We now consider what happensif employmentis rationed bylottery  
insteadofseniorityintheotherwisesamestructureastheabove．Answering  
thequestionilluminateshowcriticalthesenlorityrationingisincreating  
unemployment．The answer to this questionis that，under thelottery  
rationing，unemployment exerts enoughdownward pressure on wages to  
eliminateitselfalmostentirelywhenthemovingcostisnegligible．   
Evenwhenemploymentisrationedbylottery，equation（1），（3），（4），（5），（9），  
and（10）inSectionIIstillapply．But，inthemodelofthelotteryrationing，（6）  
Shouldbereplacedby：   
（13   Eb2＝CbP。s，Eb。＝CbP。j，andEbl＝0，  
Wherecbisnowdefinedby L（W。）／Pb．Equation（7）and（8）must be also  
replacedby   
（14）   Eb2＝CbPbs，Eb。＝CbP。J，andE。1＝C。Yb  
WherecbisdefinedbyL（Wb）／（Pb＋Yb）．Insteadof（2），thefollowing（15）  
describesthedecisionofunemployedworkersonwhethertobecome out－   
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Siders：  
（15）   Yb＝  
N／4－E8。ifWra＜W。b，  
00therwise．   
WhereWraisthereservationwageofunemployedoneyearoldmembersof  
unionaforworkingforfirmbasoutsidersofunionb．   
Equation（11）and（12）areirrelevanttOthepresentcase．   
Let us see that unemploymentis negligibleinthe modelwhen tis  
negligible．IfWra＜Wb，firmbemploysoutsidersatthewageratebetween  







1y，by（3）and（4），P8＝N／2．   
TheaboveresultsimplyWbmaXimizesWL（W）subjecttoW≦Wraand  
N／4≦＿L（W）∫N／2．Toshortentheargument，1etmeconcentrateonthecase  
OfWl＜W＊＜WO，namely，N／4＜L（W＊）＜N／2．Then，byAssumptionl，   
（16）  Wb＝min（Wra，W＊）．   
BecauseofPa＝N／2，andbecausefirmaemploysnooutsider，tWOyear  
Oldmembers ofuniona are employedby firm a withtheprobability of  
L（W8）／（N／2）underthelotteryrationing．Whennotemployedbythefirmfor  
age two and three，they earnWc．Then，for unemployed one year old  
membersofuniona，theexpectedwageratefromstayingwithunionauntil  
agetwois2WaL（Wa）／N＋Wc（1－2L（Wa）／N）．UnderAssumption3，thisplus   
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halfofthenegligiblemovingcostisthereservationwagefortakingupjobs  
atfirmbasanoutsider；namely，Wra＝2WaL（Wa）／N＋Wc（1－2L（Wa）／N）＋  
t／2．   
Therefore，OnaCCOuntOf（16），thesymmetricNashequilibriumiseitherWa  
＝Wb＝W＊，Orthesolutionof   
（17）  W＝2WL（W）／N＋Wc（1－2L（W）／N）＋t／2．  
Whenttendstozero，thesolutionof（17）doessotothesolutionof N／2＝  
L（W），thatis，Wl．ByWl＜W＊，Wa andWbtendtoWl，andhenceEtends  
toNwhenttendstozero．Thus，享fthemovingcostforworkersisnegligible，  
unemploymentis negligible and almost allworkers are employed when  
unemploymentisrationedbylottery．Thisisinasharpcontrasttosustaina－  
blelargeunemploymentunderseniorityrationing．  
Intuitionbehind the virtualdisappearance ofunemployment under the  









Other firms atlow wages as outsiders of unions of other firms．Then，  
OutSiderscomingfromotherunionsunderbidahighwagerateofaunion，  
andworkforthefirmofthatunion．Thus，unionssettingwageratesathigh  
1evelsareunabletoassurejobsfortheirmembers．Unionsarehenceforced   
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tosettheirwagesatlowlevels．Atlowunionwagerates，Onlyanegligible  
fraction of union members are unemployed，and unemployment becomes  
negligible．  
UnempJoymentandTemporaryJobs  
If Wc represents the wageincome from one periodjobs，One year Old  
workers not ernployed by firm a and b are taken to work temporarily 
elsewhere．Some may then criticize that fullemployment realizes even  
undertheseniorityrulewhenoneperiodjobsareavailable．Thiscriticism  
ismerelysemantic，andnotsubstantive9．   
Withtheliteralinterpretationofunemploymentthatunderliestheabove  
Criticism，unemployment does not exist by definition．“Unemployed”  
WOrkers（ortheirwives）occasionallytakeuptemporary，lowpaidjobsto  
makeliving．“Unemployed”workers receiving unemployment compensa－  
tions，Or uSlng uP SaVings are said to preferユeisure to work．To be  
meaningful，thetermofunemploymentshouldbeinterpretedlessnarrowly  




paid jobs，Or reCeiving unemployment compensations，Or uSing up their  
SaVings．Thesameworkermovesbackandforthbetweenthetwodifferent   
COnditionsoverbusinesscycle．Theliteralunemploymentdoesnotexist，but  
SuCh different treatments of simi1ar（same）workers by the market do．  
Whetherornotunemploymentisarightwordtodescribethetreatments，  
thesephenomena ofthedifferenttreatments are aseriouseconomicprob・   
1em to be accounted for，and are usually referred to as unemployment．   
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Unemploymentin this senseis the subject of explanationin theory of  













year old workers who take up one period jobs are those who could be 
otherwiseworkingathighwageratesforhighlyskilledjobsinmanufactur－  
ingindustries，butareactuallyworkingasvendorsathamburgershopsfor  




unemployed outsiders．  
Ⅳ Conc（usion  
As thecriticismof Friedman（1976）implies，maCrOeCOnOmictheoriesin  
theKeynesiantraditiondonottakeaccountofindividualrationalityonthe   
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part ofunemployed workers．Thetheoriescannotbe complete without a  
specification of a rationingscheme ofunemployment that would diffuse  
downward pressure on wages which theindividualrationality of un－  
employedworkerswouldimply．   
The modelof this paper takes account ofindividualrationality of  
workers，yet Shows that unemployment results．The modeldemonstrates  
thattheseniorityrationingofunemployment diffusesthedownwardpres－  
sure and so that unemploymentis sustainable．It also shows that，When  
unemploymentisrationedby seniority，aneCOnOmyfunctionsinamanner  
thatanincreaseindemandforthefirms’productsbringsaboutadecrease   
inunemployment．   
Thispaperhasalsoshownthat，incontrasttotheseniorityrationing，the  




This appendix provesthe theoreminthe main text．Inthefo1lowing，iandj   
representeitheraorb．  
Lemmal W。J＞Wト  
Proof Supposethecontrary．By（5），then，E川＋E12＝0，WhichislessthanP，／2．  
Thisviolatestheconstraintof（10．（Q．E．D．）  
Lemma2  YI＝0．   
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ProofByLemmal，W。b＞W。．Ifthisinequalityholdsstrictly，Ebl＝Oby（6）．Hence，  
by（9），Yb＝Oholds；thelemmaholdsfori＝b．Therefore，WeaSSumeW。b＝Wb．   
WhenW。b＝W。，Ebl＝CbYbby（7）．Ontheotherhand，by（9），Yb＝Ebl・Therefore，  
Yb＝00rCb＝1．Iftheformerholds，thelemmaisestablishedfori＝b．Hence，1et  
cb＝landY。＞0．Itfollowsfrom（1′），（7），（8），（11）andcb＝1thatEb。＝N／4andE。＝   
L（W。）＝PbS＋N／4＋Yb．   
By（3′）and（9′），Pbs＝N／4－Ya．Therefore，by（2′），eitherPbs＝N／40rPbs＝Eb。．  
Then，becauseofEb。＝N／4，Pbs＝N／4．Accordingly，OnehasEb＝L（W。）＝N／2＋Yb，   




Lemma3  PLs＝N／4，Pj＝N／2，andEi＝L（WI）＝El。＋E12．Furthermore，Wl≦WJ   
≦WO   
ProofByLemma2，Yb＝0．By（9），then，Ebl＝0．Therefore，by（3），Pas＝N／4．Hence，   





Lemma4 SupposeW一≦Wj十t／2whereiandj arenotidentical．Then，WI  
maximizesWL（W）subjecttoPJ2ミL（W）≦PJandW三W，＋t／2・  
ProofByLemma3，L（Wb）＝Eb2＋EbO・Hence，bytheconstraint of（10），P。／2≦  
L（Wb）＜PbmuSthold．Ifthislemmaisnottrue，therewouldbeW7thatsatisfies   
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Pb／2三L（W′）三PbandW′三Wa＋t／2andW′L（W′）＞WbL（Wb）．   
LettheunionbwagebeW′ratherthanWb．Itfollowsfrom（2），（6），and  
Assumption3thatwiththeunionbwagerateatW′andsonomorethanW8十t／2，   
firmbemploysnoneofoutsiders，butL（W′）unionbmembers．Thevalueofthe   
unlonbobjectivefunctionthenequalsW′L（W′）．Thiscontradictsthedefinitionof   






accountof L＊≦N／4（namely，WO≦＿W＊）andAssumptionl，then，Wb＝min（W8＋  
t／2，WO）・ByW8之Wb，then，Wb＝WOandsoL（Wb）＝N／4・   
ByWb＝WOandW8≦WO（duetoLemma3andthetmiondemocracy），W8≦Wb＋t／2・  
Fromthis，W8＝WOfollowssimilarlytotheabove．   
TherestofthepropositionfollowseasilyfromWa＝Wb＝WO（s）．（Q・E．D・）  




min（W＊，Wa＋t／2）・ByW8之Wb，Wb＝W＊（s）・   
ByLemma3and（11），L（W。）＝Eb。十N／4・ByWb＝W＊，L（Wb）＝L■＜N／2・There－  
fore，N／4－Eb。＞0．IfW。a＞W。＋t／2，then，Ya＞0・This contradicts Lemma2・  




Proposition3 IfN／2＜L＊（s）（equivalently，S′′≦sunderdL＊／ds＞0），E．＝N／2，  
WI＝Wl（s），andE＝N．  
Proof N／2≦L＊is equivalent to Wl之W＊・By Assumptionl，WL（W）is  




l．Witha smallcost ofstrikebreakers，thecondition ofLemmalinOsborne   
（1983）doesnothold．Thus，thefirmalwaysusesstrikebreakerswhentheircost   
islow．   
2．Toensureworkerstostaywiththefirm，thewageratemayriseasworkers  





icalchanges，thoughimplicitinthispaper，demandeven experiencedworkers，  
gettingnewlyaccustomedtotheirjobswhennewjobtenuresbegin．  
4．Seeanexplanationprecedingequation（11）．   
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5．Forauseofthesameunionobjectivefunction，SeeHart（1982）．   
6．SomeonecriticizedthatWb≦W。。WaSOpPOSitetoactualobservations．Indeed，   
OneObservesunionwageratestobehigherthanthoseofoutsidersinthecircum・   
StanceS Where outsiders areindeedworking．However，this paper attempts to   
Showthattheseniorityrulepreventsthemarketforoutsidersfromdeveloping，   
namely，that the marketisin equilibriumwithout demand for and supply of   
OutSidersundertherule．Withoutthemarketofoutsiders，theirwageratesarenot   
postedexplicitly andhencenotvisible．W。bintheinequalityisnot an observed   





withW。b＞W。＞Wa＋t／2．But，thisdoesnothappenunder N／4＜L＊＜N／2．The  
prooffor thisfactisdelegatedto the appendix．Firmbdoesnotemploy allof   
OutSiders unless cb＝1．But，When cb＝1，Yb＝O as seenin the appendix．Given  
W。b＞Wa＋t／2，thisispossibleonlywhenEa。＝N／4．   
9．SeeSolow（1986）andStiglitz（1987，p35）forsimi1arviewsonunemployment．  
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